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Judging is an exercise of personal and institutional 
character.  It is a delicate mixture of logic tempered by 
wisdom, reflection, imagination, and as much detachment 
as a trained mind can achieve . . . . [J]udging requires a 
tense engagement between the competing arguments in a 
case—an honest statement of the most powerful theories 
underlying each side’s view.  The Court’s role as 
interpreter of our most basic law demands no less.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to become disheartened and cynical about the 
judiciary when reading Lazarus’s description of the inner workings 
of the Court in Closed Chambers: The Rise, Fall, and Future of the 
Modern Supreme Court.  Unlike his vision of what he thinks the 
United States Supreme Court should be, Professor Edward Lazarus 
describes the actual Court as a flawed, dysfunctional body, where 
the Justices decide the most controversial (and arguably most 
 
       †   Ann L. Iijima is a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law.  
She thanks Malinda Schmiechen for her research assistance and insights.  This 
article has been adapted from MINN. STATE LAW LIBRARY, The Judicial Career of Esther 
M. Tomljanovich, in 14 MINN. JUSTICES SERIES (Barbara Golden & Anna M. Cherry 
eds.) (forthcoming Sept. 2005) with the permission of the Minnesota State Law 
Library.  
 1. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF THE 
MODERN SUPREME COURT 286 (Penguin Books 1999) (1998). 
1
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important) issues based on their personal predilections, and where 
the rule of law is determined by a mere majority vote.  Lazarus 
observes that “[d]eep cynics in legal academia make fun of the idea 
that there is more to lawmaking and judging than the exercise of 
power.”2 
After reading the opinions of Justice Esther Tomljanovich, 
even legal cynics may regain their faith in the judicial process and 
their belief that our courts, both state and federal, can aspire to 
Lazarus’s alternative vision. 
A number of themes appear on a recurring basis in Justice 
Tomljanovich’s opinions: an effort to balance the interests of 
society in both individual freedom and public order; a preference 
for deciding cases on narrow, clearly defined bases rather than 
announcing broad constitutional principles; a belief in the 
separation of powers; the protection of privacy rights, particularly 
those involving the sanctity of the home; a reluctance to engage in 
results-oriented decision-making, preferring instead to promote 
and trust in a well-functioning legal system; and the use of logic 
and common sense. 
These themes may reflect an unusual breadth and depth of 
experience.  Her small-town upbringing in northern Minnesota 
may have grounded her in the everyday lives and needs of working 
people.  Her struggles as a woman working her way through male-
dominated professions may have reinforced an inherent inclination 
to take a relatively temperate approach to legal issues.  Her 
experiences with the legislature as the Revisor of Statutes and as a 
trial and appellate judge may have increased her understanding of 
both the roles and the limits of those institutions. 
II. CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions in criminal cases are 
illustrative, particularly in her dissenting opinions, where she was 
empowered to voice her thoughts free of majority-garnering 
compromise. 
One such dissenting opinion involved the infamous defendant, 
Dennis Darol Linehan, who committed numerous rapes and sexual 
assaults—kidnapping and killing one of his victims.3  After serving 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996). 
2
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his sentence, Linehan was committed indefinitely to state treatment 
facilities under the Sexually Dangerous Persons (SDP) Act, a civil 
commitment statute.4 
It was clear in which direction the arrow of political 
expediency pointed.  In a special legislative session just before the 
statewide primary elections, the Minnesota House and Senate both 
passed the SDP Act by unanimous votes.5  The district court, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, and the Minnesota Supreme Court all 
upheld the constitutionality of the SDP Act.6 
Justice Tomljanovich dissented, chiding the majority for 
“shirk[ing] its duty to uphold appellant’s right to substantive due 
process . . . .”7  She quoted from Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, the flag-burning case: 
“The case before us illustrates better than most that the 
judicial power is often difficult in its exercise . . . . The 
hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do 
not like.  We make them because they are right, right in 
the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see 
them, compel the result.”8 
By affirming the trial court’s civil commitment of 
Dennis Darol Linehan . . . , this court today chooses to 
make the easy decision.  Not because it is right, not 
because it is compelled by the constitutions of either the 
United States or  Minnesota, but because it is  convenient 
. . . .  And what is the basis upon which the majority 
reaches this conclusion?  It is the fear of Dennis Darol 
 
 4. Id. at 174-76 (Minn. 1996), vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 
U.S. 1011 (1997), remanded to 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999) (on remand for 
consideration in light of Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997)).  On remand, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court again held that the SDP Act did not violate 
substantive due process.  In re Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867, 878 (Minn. 1999).  Three 
Justices disagreed, not including Justice Tomljanovich, who had retired the 
previous year.  See id. at 878-85 (Page, J., dissenting); id. at 885-87 (Lancaster, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part, joined by Anderson, J.). 
 5. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at 198 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). 
 6. Id. at 174-75 (majority opinion). 
 7. Id. at 192 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting).  Justice Page joined Justice 
Tomljanovich’s dissenting opinion and also wrote his own dissent.  Id. at 206.  He 
noted that the sentence Linehan received was not sufficiently severe and that, 
although the constitution would have allowed a sentence of life in prison without 
the possibility of release, it did not allow preventive detention.  Id. at 200 (Page, J., 
dissenting). 
 8. Id. at 191 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 
U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
3
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Linehan and what he might do upon his release.9 
She concluded that “the Due Process Clause of the Constitution 
prohibits us as a society from locking up persons simply because we 
fear them . . . even if the future bad acts are almost certain to 
occur.”10 
In State v. Paul,11 Justice Tomljanovich’s reading of the 
Constitution again required her to take an unpopular position.  In 
Paul, the majority held that a police “officer in hot pursuit of a 
person suspected of . . . driving under the influence of alcohol may 
make a warrantless entry into the suspect’s home.”12  In her 
dissenting opinion, Justice Tomljanovich acknowledged the 
important interests of the state in protecting public safety.  “I 
believe, as do the majority of thinking people, that drunk driving is 
a very serious offense.  I agree that drunk drivers should be 
removed from the public highways because their actions are 
intolerable.”13  She reasoned, however, that Paul’s privacy interests 
outweighed the interests of the State.  “If there is any place in the 
world we should feel secure and have an expectation of privacy, it is 
in our own homes.  Today, the majority has made us less secure in 
those homes without enhancing public safety.”14  She refused to 
expand the previously recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.15 
 
 9. Id. at 191-92 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 195. 
 11. 548 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1996). 
 12. Id. at 267. 
 13. Id. at 268. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Another example of this reluctance is seen in Justice Tomljanovich’s 
majority opinion in State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998).  In Varnado, 
she refused to extend any of the “well-established exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s search warrant requirement” to allow police to search a person 
suspected of a minor traffic violation before placing the person in the back of the 
squad car.  Id. at 887. 
Under the state’s proposed rule . . . no articulable suspicion would be 
necessary for a frisk.  Any stop for a minor traffic violation when the 
driver does not have a driver’s license . . . would ultimately provide 
sufficient cause for a frisk because an officer would merely have to 
request that a stopped person wait in the squad car during the license 
check.  Such a procedure would essentially eliminate any Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches in traffic stops. 
Nonetheless, we agree that officer safety is a paramount interest and that 
when an officer has a valid reasonable basis for placing a lawfully stopped 
citizen in a squad car, a frisk will often be appropriate without additional 
individual articulable suspicion. 
4
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[E]ven with hot pursuit and exigent circumstances a 
warrantless entry into a home for a misdemeanor offense 
is unreasonable . . . .  Our laws have provided for limited 
entry under warrant, consent, emergency or exigent 
circumstances when a felony is involved.  We should not 
stretch that limitation to break the promise of the 
constitutional rights of our citizens to be secure in their 
homes.16 
Justice Tomljanovich’s dissent also raised the separation of 
powers issue.  It emphasized that our system of justice requires both 
the executive and judicial departments to fulfill their roles. 
The framers of the Fourth Amendment incorporated the 
warrant requirement into it, “reflecting their conviction 
that the decision to enter a dwelling should not rest with 
the officer in the field, but rather with a detached, and 
disinterested Magistrate.”  What the majority does today is 
allow an officer in the field to make the determination for 
warrantless entry into a private dwelling. It is here that I 
disagree.  The majority would impugn the intelligence of 
our police officers by telling us that the officers cannot 
know whether an offense is a felony or misdemeanor 
before entering a home.  Police officers know the law; 
they know whether they have a felony or misdemeanor on 
their hands.17 
Justice Tomljanovich seemed particularly protective of the 
rights of criminal defendants where, as in Paul, the government’s 
actions implicated privacy rights as well as Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all 
the forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may 
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; 
the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot 
enter—all his forces dares not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement!”  Our forefathers believed as 
passionately in the sanctity of the home as do I.  They 
drafted the Fourth Amendment to deny federal law 
enforcement such intrusive entry and the Fourteenth 
Amendment extended that restriction to state law 
enforcement personnel as well.  Our own Minnesota 
 
Id. at 891. 
 16. 548 N.W.2d at 268-69 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 269 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582 n.17 (1980)). 
5
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Constitution echoes those same tenets and we should not 
now decide that the Crown may enter with the storm!18 
State v. Wynne19 also implicated both Fourth Amendment and 
privacy issues.  In Wynne, the police executed a warrant to search 
Joy Pamela Wynne’s residence, her person, and any other person 
located at her residence.20  Joy’s daughter, Andrea Wynne, drove up 
while the search was in progress.21  Police officers took Andrea 
Wynne’s purse from her and escorted her into the house.22  They 
found controlled substances in her purse and charged her with 
felony possession.23 
Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion held that the search 
was unconstitutional.24  The opinion carefully parsed through a 
number of exceptions to the warrant requirement, finding that 
none justified the search of the defendant’s purse.25  It leavened a 
thorough examination of precedent with a liberal dose of logic and 
common sense.  Discussing whether the search fell within the 
Terry26 doctrine, it stated: 
When Andrea Wynne arrived at her home, officers met 
her at the car in which she arrived, determined that she 
was an occupant of the premises being searched, took her 
purse and walked her and separately her purse, into the 
house.  First, we fail to understand how the purse 
remained a threat to officers when it had been taken away 
from its owner.  Second, even if we accepted that the 
purse did remain a threat because Andrea Wynne could 
somehow have retrieved it from officers inside the house, 
it was a threat that the officers themselves created by 
bringing the purse inside the house.  The officers then 
went about remedying the self-generated dangerous 
 
 18. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 269-70 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting) (quoting Miller 
v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (citing William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 
Address to the House of Commons in England (1763))). 
 19. 552 N.W.2d 218 (Minn. 1996). 
 20. Id. at 219. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 221. 
 25. Id. at 221-22. 
 26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that when a police officer 
reasonably believes a suspect might be engaged in criminal activity and reasonably 
believes that suspect might be armed, the officer is entitled to conduct a limited 
search of the suspect’s outer clothing for weapons).   
6
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situation by invading Andrea Wynne’s privacy.27 
Justice Tomljanovich acknowledged the realities of the duties 
of police officers, but again rested her analysis upon the respective 
roles of the executive and judicial branches. 
We understand that in the excitement, and oftentimes the 
danger of a drug search, the officers do not have time to 
reflect on the parameters of Terry.  We, however, do have 
that luxury.  We have a duty to the citizens and to law 
enforcement officers to analyze the law carefully and set 
out clearly the limits of a search.  In our experience law 
enforcement officers are not anxious to exceed the law, 
and for that reason we need to carefully define the limits 
of a search warrant. 28 
In State v. Carter,29 Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion held 
that the right to privacy in the home encompassed persons visiting 
for commercial (albeit illegal) purposes.30  In Carter, the defendant 
was bagging cocaine in another person’s apartment.31  A police 
officer, acting on a tip, observed this activity after he “left the 
sidewalk, walked across the grass, climbed over the bushes, placed 
his face within 12 to 18 inches of  the window  and  peered   
through  a small  gap  between  the   blinds . . . .”32  Justice 
Tomljanovich’s opinion held that the police officer had violated 
the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.33 
Although Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion relied on the 
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, it also considered 
the case’s ramifications on the privacy rights of home owners.  
“Although society does not recognize as valuable the task of 
bagging cocaine, we conclude that society does recognize as 
valuable the right of property owners or leaseholders to invite 
persons into the privacy of their homes to conduct a common task, 
be it legal or illegal activity.”34  She pointed out that “conduct that 
would constitute an illegal search does not become something less 
merely because the police had reasonable suspicion and embarked 
on a search of limited intrusiveness.  As such, we once again reject 
 
 27. Wynne, 552 N.W.2d at 222. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1997), rev’d, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 30. Id. at 176. 
 31. Id. at 171. 
 32. Id. at 178. 
 33. Id. at 171. 
 34. Id. at 176. 
7
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the notion that a little bit of information justifies a little bit of a 
search.”35  The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision, 
holding that Carter, only there for a short period for business 
purposes, did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy.36 
State v. Dickerson37 also implicated both privacy and Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Justice Tomljanovich’s majority opinion again 
refused to expand an exception to the warrant requirement.  
Under the Terry doctrine, 
police may stop and frisk a person when (1) they have a 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a suspect might be 
engaged in criminal activity and (2) the officer reasonably 
believes the suspect might be armed and dangerous.  If 
both of those factors are present, police may “conduct a 
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such 
person[] in an attempt to discover weapons which might 
be used to assault him.”38 
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion refused to extend this “plain view” 
exception to the “plain feel” of an object that could not conceivably 
be a weapon, in this case, a marble-sized lump of crack cocaine. 
Because we do not believe the senses of sight and touch 
are equivalent, we decline to extend the plain view 
doctrine to the sense of touch.  We reach this conclusion 
for two primary reasons.  First, the sense of touch is 
inherently less immediate and less reliable than the sense 
of sight . . . .  But even more important, the sense of touch 
is far more intrusive into the personal  privacy  that  is at  
the core of  the fourth amendment . . . .  Observing 
something that is held out to plain view is not a search at 
all.  Physically touching a person cannot be considered 
anything but a search.39 
As in many of her opinions, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion in 
Dickerson demonstrated her use of common sense.  In Dickerson, she 
rejected the police officer’s testimony that he immediately 
identified a lump of crack cocaine by touch. 
The officer’s “immediate” perception is especially 
remarkable because this lump weighed 0.2 grams and was 
no bigger than a marble.  We are led to surmise that the 
 
 35. Id. at 178-79. 
 36. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998). 
 37. 481 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 1992), aff’d, 508 U.S. 366 (1993). 
 38. Id. at 843 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). 
 39. Dickerson, 481 N.W.2d at 845 (citations omitted). 
8
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officer’s sense of touch must compare with that of the 
fabled princess who couldn’t sleep when a pea was hidden 
beneath her pile of mattresses.  But a close examination of 
the record reveals that like the precocious princess, the 
officer’s “immediate” discovery in this case is fiction, not 
fact.40 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the 
reasoning in Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion, holding that “police 
officers may seize nonthreatening contraband detected during a 
protective patdown search of the sort permitted by Terry.”41  It 
affirmed the judgment, however, because the officer’s search of 
Dickerson had gone beyond what Terry allowed.42 
In re Welfare of R.A.V.,43 the well-known cross-burning case, 
required Justice Tomljanovich to balance two interests in which she 
firmly believed—constitutional protection of the right of free 
expression and jurisprudential principles constraining the court 
from running roughshod over the acts of the legislature.  In R.A.V., 
a Saint Paul ordinance provided that 
[w]hoever places on public or private property a symbol, 
object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including 
but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which 
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses 
anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly 
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.44 
Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion observed that “[a]lthough the . . . 
ordinance should have been more carefully drafted,”45 the court 
was able to uphold it by following long-standing constitutional 
 
 40. Id. at 844. 
 41. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). 
 42. Id. at 379.  “If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect’s outer clothing 
and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately 
apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect’s privacy beyond that already 
authorized by the officer’s search for weapons . . . .”  Id. at 375.  Here, however, 
the officer was able to identify the contraband only after “‘squeezing, sliding and 
otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant’s pocket.’”  Id. at 378 
(citation omitted).  Honoring function over form, Justice Tomljanovich 
categorizes Dickerson with the opinions reversed by the United States Supreme 
Court.  E-mail from Justice Esther Tomljanovich to Ann Iijima, Professor of Law, 
William Mitchell College of Law (Nov. 21, 2003, 12:44 CST) (on file with author). 
 43. 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev’d sub nom R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 
U.S. 377 (1992). 
 44. Id. at 508. 
 45. Id. at 511. 
9
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principles.46  “When possible . . . this court narrowly construes a law 
subject to facial overbreadth attack so as to limit its scope to 
conduct that falls outside first amendment protection while clearly 
prohibiting its application to constitutionally protected 
expression.”47  Accordingly, the court upheld the ordinance after 
narrowing its scope to apply only to “fighting words,” that is, 
expression that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”48 
In reversing this decision, the United States Supreme Court 
had to devise a new general principle.  For the half-century leading 
up to R.A.V., the Court consistently held that fighting words did 
not constitute protected speech.49  In R.A.V., however, the Court 
modified this principle and held that a narrowly-tailored, but 
content-based restriction on fighting words would violate the First 
Amendment.50 
Once again, in State v. Holmes,51 Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion 
refused to expand the exceptions to the warrant requirement—in 
that case, the exception for inventory searches.  A University of 
Minnesota parking monitor discovered that an illegally parked 
vehicle had five unpaid parking tickets.52  She ordered the vehicle 
to be towed.53  When Holmes returned to his car, the parking 
monitor felt intimidated and called the University police 
department for assistance, despite the fact that Holmes had been 
respectful and cooperative.54  The officer asked Holmes for 
identification and patted him down, finding a weapon’s magazine 
clip.55  Although the parking monitor had already looked into the 
vehicle to inventory any items, the officer searched the vehicle 
again, finding an empty gun case on the floor and a handgun in 
 
 46. Id. at 509. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 510 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). 
 49. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 377 (1992).  This was not the only 
case in which the United States Supreme Court contrived a new legal principle in 
response to Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions.  See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 
366 (1993) (affirming Dickerson but adopting “plain feel” exception to warrant 
requirement).  See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
 51. 569 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1997). 
 52. Id. at 182. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 183. 
 55. Id. 
10
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the glove compartment.56  Holmes apparently admitted that the 
handgun was his and that he did not have a permit to carry it.57  He 
was charged with unlawful possession of a pistol.58 
In her majority opinion, Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a 
unanimous court, held that the trial court had not erred in 
suppressing the pistol and the defendant’s statements, articulating 
the criteria for a valid inventory search.59  She confirmed that the 
police may make a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle in 
order to inventory the items.60  She stated, however, that there are 
limits to this exception.61  The court will find such a search to 
constitute “a reasonable inventory search only if police followed 
standard procedures in conducting the search, and only if police 
conducted the search, at least in part, for the purpose of obtaining 
an inventory.”62  She noted that “searches conducted ‘in bad faith 
or for the sole purpose of investigation,’ are not otherwise valid as 
inventory searches.”63  She acknowledged that making that 
determination might be difficult, but “suggested that faith is ‘bad’ 
and investigative purpose ‘sole’ only when an inventory search that 
otherwise would not have occurred is brought about.”64  Because 
the search had been for the purpose of finding the pistol, it was not 
a valid inventory search and did not fall within that exception to 
the warrant requirement.65 
Although often protective of the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants, Justice Tomljanovich’s positions were based 
firmly on the Constitution, rather than on any particular pro-
defendant sympathies.  Her opinions permitted police officers to 
perform their jobs effectively while they protected the procedural 
and substantive rights of the accused.  In a number of cases, her 
opinions upheld the state’s actions against even arguably 
sympathetic defendants. 
For example, in State v. Pike,66 Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 184. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 185-86. 
 60. Id. at 186. 
 61. Id. at 187. 
 62. Id. at 188. 
 63. Id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, U.S. 367, 372 (1987)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 188-89. 
 66. 551 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. 1996). 
11
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held that the State had “clearly and unequivocally” proven that the 
trial court erred in dismissing gross misdemeanor charges against a 
defendant.67  The police officer claimed to have stopped Pike’s 
vehicle because it was driving slowly, its owner’s license had been 
suspended, and the driver matched the owner’s description.68  The 
district court, not believing that the officer based his stop on the 
vehicle’s speed or that the officer had been able to see the driver, 
dismissed the case, finding that the stop had been “the product of 
mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”69  Justice Tomljanovich’s 
opinion stated that, although warrantless searches are generally per 
se unreasonable, a “limited investigative stop is lawful if the state 
can show the officer to have had a ‘particularized and objective 
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal 
activity.’”70  It observed that, even if two of the officer’s three 
rationales for stopping the defendant were disregarded, the 
remaining rationale provided sufficient justification: 
We hold that it is not unconstitutional for an officer to 
make a brief, investigatory, Terry-type stop of a vehicle if 
the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a 
revoked license so long as the officer remains unaware of 
any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption 
that the owner is driving the vehicle.71 
As was her preference, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion set out a 
clear rule for police officers and reviewing courts. 
Justice Tomljanovich believed in the ability of a properly 
functioning legal system to produce justice.  Accordingly, her 
decisions often focused on maintaining the proper balance 
between the branches of government and on ensuring the proper 
role of judges and attorneys. 
In State v. Krotzer,72 Krotzer, a nineteen-year-old man, had 
consensual sexual intercourse with his fourteen-year-old 
girlfriend.73  After failing to reach a plea agreement with the 
prosecutor, Krotzer pleaded guilty to statutory rape.74  The district 
court did not accept the plea agreement and, instead, granted 
 
 67. Id. at 921-22. 
 68. Id. at 921. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)). 
 71. Id. at 922. 
 72. 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1996). 
 73. Id. at 253. 
 74. Id. 
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Krotzer’s request to stay adjudication of the charge.75  It placed 
Krotzer on probation and ordered him to serve sixty days in jail and 
to pay fines, fees, and surcharges.76  The district court apparently 
overrode the prosecutor’s decision to try Krotzer for a felony 
because of extenuating circumstances: Krotzer and his girlfriend 
were no longer engaging in sexual relations, the girl and her 
mother did not want to have Krotzer prosecuted, and Krotzer 
would have had to register as a sex offender, despite the lack of a 
history of aggressiveness.77 
Justice Tomljanovich’s dissent emphasized the separation of 
powers issue.  “Our system of government works because each of 
the three branches respects the authority of the other—even when 
we think we could do their job better than they do.  The majority 
has permitted the courts to encroach into an area reserved to the 
executive branch by the Constitution.”78  Justice Tomljanovich 
disagreed with the lenient treatment of the defendant and would 
have relied on the statute’s purpose of protecting minors and on 
the lack of statutory authority for the district court’s action.79  Her 
opinion emphasized her respect for legislative policy-making 
powers and her disapproval of court overreaching.  In her typically 
straight-forward style, she stated, “I am at a loss to understand how 
the court can put a person on probation and order jail time when 
the court has not accepted a guilty plea and adjudged the person 
guilty.”80 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Justice Tomljanovich apparently did not find the defendant 
particularly sympathetic, stating that 
[t]he majority notes that the victim’s mother felt the court should ‘let it 
end’ without prosecution.  It is incredible that the victim’s mother has 
given ‘her blessing’ to the relationship to preserve her good relationship 
with her daughter.  This law is designed to protect the minor victim from 
her own immature judgment and that of her mother if necessary. 
  Id. at 260. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.; see also Mark H. Zitzewitz, Comment, State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial 
Authority—Going Where No Court Has Gone Before, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1997) 
(examining the holding of Krotzer and arguing that the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court erred in finding that inherent judicial 
powers include the ability to stay adjudication of criminal prosecutions). 
 80. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d at 260 (Tomljanovich, J., dissenting). 
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III. CIVIL CASES 
Justice Tomljanovich’s reverence for the home was apparent in 
her civil opinions, as well as in her criminal opinions.  In Wegner v. 
Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co.,81 a police SWAT team used tear gas 
and flash-bang grenades to apprehend an armed suspect, causing 
over $70,000 in damages to Wegner’s home.82  Justice 
Tomljanovich, writing for a unanimous court, held “that where an 
innocent third party’s property is damaged by the police in the 
course of apprehending a suspect, that property is damaged within 
the meaning of the constitution,”83 and the municipality must 
“compensate the innocent party for the resulting damages.”84  In 
Wegner, the court was presented with a number of complex 
constitutional issues, including eminent domain, takings, and the 
doctrine of public necessity.  These analyses required the court to 
weigh the responsibility of the police to protect the general public 
against the harm to innocent parties.  Justice Tomljanovich 
concluded: 
The policy considerations in this case center around the 
basic notions of fairness and justice.  At its most basic 
level, the issue is whether it is fair to allocate the entire 
risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the 
public.  We do not believe the imposition of such a 
burden on the innocent citizens of this state would square 
with the underlying principles of our system of justice.85 
Justice Tomljanovich, however, made it clear “that the individual 
police officers, who were acting in the public interest, cannot be 
held personally liable.  Instead, the citizens of the City should all 
bear the cost of the benefit conferred.”86 
 
 81. 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991). 
 82. Id. at 39. 
 83. Id. at 41-42. 
 84. Id. at 42. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  Justice Tomljanovich’s respect for law enforcement personnel was 
apparent in a number of other cases.  For example, in McDonnell v. Commissioner of 
Public Safety, the court considered a Minnesota statute allowing police to require 
drivers to submit to alcohol tests.  473 N.W.2d 848 (1991).  This statute allowed 
the suspect to consult with an attorney, but not until after submitting to testing.  
Id. at 850 n.1.  Justice Tomljanovich’s opinion conceded that there is no right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution until after 
formal charges have been made. Id. at 853.  It pointed out, however, that the 
Minnesota Constitution provided a right to counsel at the time an individual is 
asked to take a blood alcohol test.  Id.  The court had just adopted that 
14
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In Miller v. Colortyme, Inc.,87 Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a 
unanimous court, determined that the anti-usury provisions of the 
Consumer Credit Sales Act applied to rent-to-own transactions.88  
Her opinion observed that “[t]he purpose of the usury law is to 
protect consumers by limiting the amount of interest which can be 
charged on a credit sale or loan.”89 
The legislature’s decision to treat rent-to-own transactions 
as credit sales recognizes that although these transactions 
purport to be short-term leases, they operate in substance 
much like ordinary installment sales.  Consumers who 
purchase goods through rent-to-own agreements may not 
incur debt, but they still implicitly pay interest in return 
for the ability to pay for goods over time.  Moreover, rent-
to-own customers may not have an absolute obligation to 
repay a principal amount, but their situation is analogous 
to that of ordinary buyers on credit in that they must 
either forfeit possession of a good or continue paying for 
it.90 
Justice Tomljanovich noted that, under a number of the 
transactions in question, the customers would have paid about 
twice the stated cash prices by the time they actually owned the 
purchased goods.91 
Justice Tomljanovich’s concurring opinion in Bilal v. Northwest 
 
interpretation of the state constitution that same day in another case.  Id.  Justice 
Tomljanovich mitigated the impact that this new rule would have on law 
enforcement personnel: 
Generally, decisions of this court overruling past decisions are given 
retroactive effect.  However, given the reasonable reliance of law 
enforcement officials on prior decisions of this court . . . and given the 
enormous burden on the administration of justice that would result from 
giving Friedman completely retroactive effect, we limit the application of 
Friedman to the three appeals now before this court, to any case in which 
the Implied Consent Advisory  has been challenged as a violation of the 
right to counsel guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution now pending 
. . . and to any case arising after the date of Friedman’s release. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Her opinion also held that the Constitution does not allow 
the police to threaten drivers refusing to submit to testing with potential criminal 
penalties that could not be imposed on them, but it did allow use of a driver’s 
refusal to submit to testing as evidence that the driver was intoxicated.  Id. at 855. 
 87. 518 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1994). 
 88. Id. at 546. 
 89. Id. at 549. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 546. 
15
Iijima: The Jurisprudence of Justice Esther Tomljanovich: Balancing the S
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
13IIJIMA_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:05:48 AM 
450 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
Airlines, Inc.92 evidences both her fondness for common sense and 
her understanding of the important yet limited role of the 
judiciary.  In that case, the spouse of an airline employee, traveling 
as a non-revenue passenger, was wearing sandals without stockings 
in violation of the airline’s dress code.93  An airline employee, not 
knowing that the passenger was Muslim, told her that she should 
dress as if she were “going to church.”94  Justice Anderson, writing 
for a unanimous court, held that the airline employee had not 
intentionally engaged in religious discrimination, observing that 
the employee had not even known that the passenger was Muslim.95  
Justice Tomljanovich concurred specially: 
I concur with the result reached by the majority, but 
write to express my concern that this matter ever reached 
the courts.  It is important to be sensitive to racial, 
religious and gender differences and to avoid 
discrimination.  However, this lawsuit defies common 
sense. 
The majority pointed out that the word “church” does 
not possess the inherent derogatory qualities of an 
epithet.  I agree.  I believe that a chance remark such as 
the one in this case that was not motivated by any 
discriminatory intent should not be actionable just 
because it includes the word “church.” 
We must eliminate the use of language that diminishes 
another person’s humanity, but this surely was not such 
language.  How much better it would have been when Ms. 
Bilal was offended by Ms. Patrick’s reference to church if 
she had sat down with Ms. Patrick and her supervisors and 
explained her feelings.  An apology and a better 
understanding of the situation would, no doubt, have 
resulted.  The courts simply cannot be the arbitrator of all 
hurt feelings. 
It is important that we communicate our feelings to 
one another, but if we must live in fear that a lawsuit will 
result each time we make a comment or use a word that 
someone, somewhere, sometime might find offensive, all 
human exchange of words and ideas will cease, and our 
 
 92. 537 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1995). 
 93. Id. at 616. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 619. 
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world will be a worse place in which to live.96 
Dziubak v. Mott97 also focused on the role of the judicial system, 
requiring the court to balance the interests of criminal defendants 
and the needs of the criminal justice system.  Justice 
Tomljanovich’s majority opinion granted immunity to the public 
defenders in Dziubak’s suit against his state public defenders for 
malpractice.98  Although, like the dissenters, Justice Tomljanovich 
was concerned about denying a remedy to indigent defendants, she 
took a longer view, focusing on the practical effects of extending or 
withholding immunity from public defenders.99  She distinguished 
the relative positions of criminal defense lawyers in the public and 
private sectors, observing that public defenders are required to 
represent the clients assigned to them, regardless of the size and 
difficulty of their caseloads.100  She also recognized the lack of 
resources available to the office of the public defender.101  “It would 
be an unfair burden to subject the public defender to possible 
malpractice for acts or omissions due to impossible caseloads and 
an under-funded office: something completely out of the 
defender’s control.”102 
Since justice demands that a defense be provided to 
criminal defendants who are not able to afford privately 
retained counsel, it is essential that a sufficient number of 
qualified attorneys be willing and able to provide this 
defense.  Immunity will aid in the continued recruitment 
of attorneys to perform this service in our criminal justice 
system; such service is eagerly sought by most attorneys.  
The accused defendant is not the sole beneficiary.  Society 
as a whole depends upon the role of defense counsel to 
secure an ordered system of liberty and justice, as 
ordained by our Constitution. 
The extension of immunity to public defenders will 
ensure that the resources available to the public defender 
will be used for the defense of the accused, rather than 
diminished through the defense of public defenders 
against civil suits for malpractice.  Immunity will conserve 
 
 96. Id. at 620 (Tomljanovich, J., concurring). 
 97. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993). 
 98. Id. at 773. 
 99. Id. at 776. 
 100. Id. at 775. 
 101. Id. at 776. 
 102. Id. 
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these resources to provide an effective defense to the 
greatest number of indigent defendants.103 
Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham104 required the court to 
consider the division of powers among the branches of 
government.  In that case, Justice Tomljanovich, writing for a 
unanimous court, held that a corporation appearing in district 
court had to be represented by a licensed attorney, even when the 
matter arose in conciliation court.105  She reasoned that, despite the 
fact that a Minnesota statute could be read to give corporations the 
power to appear in court through non-attorney officers, such a 
reading would violate the state constitution.106 
Since corporations are distinct legal entities, any 
individual attempting to appear on behalf of the 
corporation would, in effect, be practicing law.  Based on 
the legislature’s power to enact criminal statutes, it is clear 
that the legislature has the authority to determine who 
may or may not be prosecuted for the unauthorized 
practice of law.  This, however, does not mean that the 
legislature may decide who may properly practice law 
before the courts of this state.  Under Article 3, Section 1 
of the Minnesota Constitution, this power is vested solely 
in the judiciary.107 
She discussed the policies underlying the attorney 
requirement, pointing out that a “non-attorney agent of a 
corporation is not subject to the ethical standards of the bar and is 
not subject to court supervision or discipline.  The agent knows but 
one master, the corporation, and owes no duty to the courts.”108  
Moreover, she observed that, “[i]f district courts are to handle their 
increasingly crowded and complex dockets efficiently and justly, it 
is important that clients’ causes be presented by persons trained 
 
 103. Id. at 777-78. 
 104. 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992). 
 105. Id. at 753. 
 106. Id. at 755. 
 107. Id. (citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 310 
Minn. 313, 318, 251 N.W.2d 620, 623 (1976)).  Article III, section 1 of the 
Minnesota Constitution provides: “The powers of government shall be divided into 
three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or 
persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any 
of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances 
expressly provided in this constitution.”  Id. (citing MINN. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
 108. Id. at 754. 
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and licensed to do so.”109 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Some jurists believe that one should first determine what 
justice requires and then use the law to achieve that result.  In 
contrast, because Justice Tomljanovich typically follows the law 
rather than her own predilections, her decisions cannot 
consistently be labeled either “liberal” or “conservative.”110  Unable 
to predict which side of a controversy Justice Tomljanovich will 
take—state or criminal defendant, plaintiff or defendant—some 
might criticize her jurisprudence as “inconsistent.”  At a deeper 
level of analysis, however, Justice Tomljanovich’s opinions are 
consistent.  They reflect an abiding belief in the power of the law to 
achieve justice—a belief that, by following the dictates of the law, 
justice generally will result.  They demonstrate a belief in the 
structural provisions of the United States and Minnesota 
Constitutions.  They show a respect for the separation of powers 
between the federal and state governments and for the division of 
powers among the governmental branches.  They also evidence her 
belief in both the desire and ability of people at the heart of the 
government bodies to perform their roles with competence and 
integrity. 
Justice Tomljanovich’s judicial philosophy was consistent with 
her approach to her work—it was not about her, her ego, or her 
view of the law.  She said that she found the greatest satisfaction not 
from the ego satisfaction, nor from deciding big cases, but from the 
opportunity to make a difference in someone’s life, to have a 
positive influence at a critical juncture in that person’s life.  “The 
job is incredibly important, but you’re not.  It’s real important that 
 
 109. Id. at 755. 
 110. Her official actions, as well as her opinions, demonstrated a lack of 
partisanship.  She was appointed to the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1990 by 
Governor Rudy Perpich.  ANNA CHERRY ET AL., 100 WHO MADE A DIFFERENCE 16 
(2001).   Although she was appointed by Governor Perpich, a Democrat, the 
timing of her resignation permitted Governor Arnie Carlson, a Republican, to fill 
the vacancy.  Robert Whereatt, Tomljanovich to Retire From High Court; She Helped 
Lead Way For Women on Bench, STAR TRIB., May 1, 1998, at 1B.  Although her April, 
1998 resignation did not become effective until August, 1998, it allowed Governor 
Carlson to name her successor before filings for the office opened in July of 1998.  
Id.  This action kept the judicial post out of the election process, and her successor 
did not have to run for re-election until 2000.  Id. 
19
Iijima: The Jurisprudence of Justice Esther Tomljanovich: Balancing the S
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
13IIJIMA_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  10:05:48 AM 
454 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
you have people who know that.”111 
 
 
 111. CHRISTINE KRUEGER, THREE PATHS TO LEADERSHIP: A STUDY OF WOMEN ON 
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 18 (1994) (statement of Justice Tomljanovich). 
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